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Abstract The Housing Market problem is a widely studied resource allocation
problem. In this problem, each agent can only receive a single object and has
preferences over all objects. Starting from an initial endowment, we want to reach
a certain assignment via a sequence of rational trades. We first consider whether an
object is reachable for a given agent under a social network, where a trade between
two agents is allowed if they are neighbors in the network and no participant has
a deficit from the trade. Assume that the preferences of the agents are strict (no
tie among objects is allowed). This problem is polynomial-time solvable in a star-
network and NP-complete in a tree-network. It is left as a challenging open problem
whether the problem is polynomial-time solvable when the network is a path. We
answer this open problem positively by giving a polynomial-time algorithm. Then
we show that when the preferences of the agents are weak (ties among objects are
allowed), the problem becomes NP-hard when the network is a path and can be
solved in polynomial time when the network is a star. Besides, we consider the
computational complexity of finding different optimal assignments for the problem
in the special case where the network is a path or a star.
Keywords Resource Allocation · Social Choice Theory · Pareto Efficiency ·
Computational Complexity · Coordination and Cooperation
1 Introduction
Allocating indivisible objects to agents is an important problem in both computer
science and economics. A widely studied setting is that each agent can only receive
one single object and each agent has preferences over objects. The problem is called
the Assignment problem [1, 2], or the House Allocation problem [3, 4]. When
Sen Huang
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
E-mail: huangsen47@gmail.com
Mingyu Xiao (The corresponding author)
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
E-mail: myxiao@gmail.com
2 Sen Huang, Mingyu Xiao
each agent is initially endowed with an object and we want to reallocate objects
under some conditions without any monetary transfers, the problem is known as
Housing Market problem [5]. Housing Market has several real-life applica-
tions such as allocation of housings [6], organ exchange [7], and so on. There are
two different preference sets for agents. One is strict, which is a full ordinal list
of all objects, and the other one is weak, where agents are allowed to be indiffer-
ent between objects. Both preference sets have been widely studied. Under strict
preferences, the celebrated Top Trading Cycle rule [5] has several important prop-
erties, e.g. strategy-proofness, and has been frequently used in mechanism design.
Some modifications of Top Trading Cycle rule, called Top Trading Absorbing Sets
rule and Top Cycles rule, were introduced for weak preferences [8, 9]. More studies
of Housing Market under the two preference sets from different aspects can be
found in the literature [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
Some rules, such as Top Trading Cycle, allow a single exchange to involve many
agents. However, exchanges of objects involving only two agents are basic, since
they only require the minimum number of participants in the exchange and are
very common in real life.
In some models, it is implicitly assumed that all agents have a tie with others
such that they know each other, and can make some exchanges. However, some
agents often do not know each other, and cannot exchange, even if they can mu-
tually get benefits. So Gourve`s et al. [15] studied Housing Market where the
agents are embedded in a social network to denote the ability to exchange objects
between them. In fact, recently it is a hot topic to study resource allocation prob-
lems over social networks and analyze the influence of networks. Abebe et al. [16]
and Bei et al. [17] introduced social networks of agents into the Fair Division
problem of cake cutting. They defined (local) fairness concepts based on social
networks and then compared them to the classic fairness notions and designed
new protocols to find envy-free allocations in cake cutting. Bredereck et al. [18]
and Beynier et al. [19] also considered network-based Fair Division in allocat-
ing indivisible resources, where they assumed that objects were embedded in a
network and each agent could only be assigned a connected component.
In this paper, we study Housing Market in a social network with simple
trades between pairs of neighbors in the network. In this model, there are the
same number of agents and objects and each agent is initially endowed with a sin-
gle object. Each agent has a preference list of all objects. The agents are embedded
in a social network which determines their ability to exchange their objects. Two
agents may swap their items under two conditions: they are neighbors in the so-
cial network, and they find it mutually profitable (or no one will become worse
under weak preferences). Under this model, many problems have been studied,
i.e,Object Reachability (OR), Assignment Reachability (AR) and Pareto
Efficiency (PE), see the references given by Gourve`s et al. [15]. Object Reach-
ability is to determine whether an object is reachable for a given agent from the
initial endowment via swaps. Assignment Reachability is to determine whether
a certain assignment of objects to all agents is reachable. Pareto Efficiency is
to find a Pareto optimal assignment within all the reachable assignments.
For Assignment Reachability, it is known that the problem can be solved
in polynomial time in trees [15] and cycles [? ] and becomes NP-hard in general
graphs [15] and complete graphs [? ]. In this paper, we mainly consider Object
Reachability and Pareto Efficiency under different preferences. Damamme
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et al. [20] proved that it is NP-hard to find a reachable assignment maximiz-
ing the minimum of the individual utilities, which can be modified to show the
NP-hardness of Object Reachability in complete graphs. Gourve`s et al. [15]
further showed that Object Reachability is polynomial-time solvable under
star-structures and NP-complete under tree-structures. For the network being a
path, they solved the special case where the given agent is an endpoint (a leaf)
in the path and left it unsolved for the general path case. All the above results
are under strict preferences. In this paper, we will answer the open problem posi-
tively by giving a polynomial-time algorithm for Object Reachability in a path
under strict preferences. Furthermore, we prove that Weak Object Reachabil-
ity (Object Reachability under the weak preferences) is NP-hard in a path
and polynomial-time solvable in a star. Very recently, another research group also
obtained a polynomial-time algorithm for Object Reachability in paths under
strict preferences independently [21]. The main ideas of the two algorithms are
similar: first characterizing some structural properties of the problem and then re-
ducing the problem to the polynomial-time solvable 2-Sat problem. Furthermore,
the paper [21] also showed that Object Reachability in cycles under strict pref-
erences is polynomial-time solvable. For Pareto Efficiency, Gourve`s et al. [15]
proved that the problem under strict preferences is NP-hard in general graphs
and polynomial-time solvable in a star or path. In this paper, we further consider
Weak Pareto Efficiency (Pareto Efficiency under the weak preferences)
and show that it is NP-hard in a path. Our results and previous results are sum-
marized in Table 1, where we use OR to denote Object Reachability and PE
to denote Pareto Efficiency and the precise definitions of OR and PE are given
in Section 2.3.
Table 1 The computational complexity results
Preferences Problems
The network
Stars Paths Trees General Graphs
Strict
OR P [15]
P
NP-hard [15] NP-hard [15]
(Theorem 1)
PE P [15] P [15] ? NP-hard [15]
Weak
OR
P NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard
(Lemma 5) (Theorem 2) (Theorem 2) (Theorem 2)
PE ?
NP-hard NP-hard
NP-hard [15]
(Theorem 3) (Theorem 3)
In Table 1, our results are marked as bold and the problems left unsolved are
denoted by ‘?’. One of the major results in this paper is the polynomial-time al-
gorithm for Object Reachability under strict preferences in a path. Although
paths are rather simple graph structures, Object Reachability in a path is not
easy at all, as mentioned in [15] that “Despite its apparent simplicity, Reach-
able Object (Object Reachability) in a path is a challenging open problem
when no restriction on the agent’s location is made. We believe that this case
is at the frontier of tractability.” Our polynomial-time algorithm involves several
techniques and needs to call solvers for the 2-Sat problem after characterizing
some structural properties of the problem. On the other hand, it is a little bit
surprising that Object Reachability in paths becomes NP-hard under weak
preferences. Note that under weak preferences, the number of feasible swaps in
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an instance may increase. This may increase the searching space of the problem
dramatically and make the problem harder to search for a solution. Furthermore,
we also show that Weak Object Reachability in stars is polynomial-time solv-
able. Although the algorithm will use the idea of the algorithm for the problem
under strict preferences [15], it involves new techniques. In order to study the prob-
lems systematically and further understand the computational complexity of the
problems, we also consider Pareto Efficiency and give several hardness results.
The following part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
some background. Section 3 tackles the reachability of an object for an agent in
a path under strict preferences. Section 4 studies Weak Object Reachability
and Weak Pareto Efficiency in paths, and Section 5 studies Weak Object
Reachability and Weak Pareto Efficiency in stars. Section 6 makes some
concluding remarks. Partial results of this paper were presented on the thirty-third
AAAI conference on artificial intelligence (AAAI 2019) and appeared as [22]. Due
to the space limitation, the conference version [22] only presented Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 with proof sketches. In this version, we gave the full proofs of the
two theorems and further considered Weak Object Reachability and Weak
Pareto Efficiency in paths and stars. Section 4 and Section 5 are newly added.
2 Background
2.1 Models
There are a set N = {1, ..., n} of n agents and a set O = {o1, ..., on} of n objects.
An assignment σ is a mapping from N to O, where σ(i) is the object held by
agent i in σ. We also use σT (oi) to denote the agent who holds object oi in σ.
Each agent holds exactly one object at all time. Initially, the agents are endowed
with objects, and the initial endowment is denoted by σ0. We assume without loss
of generality that σ0(i) = oi for every agent i.
Each agent has a preference regarding all objects. A strict preference is ex-
pressed as a full linear order of all objects. Agent i’s preference is denoted by ≻i,
and oa ≻i ob indicates the fact that agent i prefers object oa to object ob. The
whole strict preference profile for all agents is represented by ≻. For weak prefer-
ences, an agent may be indifferent between two objects. For two disjoint subsets
of objects S1 and S2, we use S1 ≻i S2 to indicate that all objects in S1 (resp.,
S2) are equivalent for agent i and agent i prefers any object in S1 to any object
in S2. We use oa i ob to denote that agent i likes oa at least as the same as ob.
Two relations oa i ob and ob i oa together imply that oa and ob are equivalent
for agent i, denoted by ob =i oa. We may use  to denote the whole weak pref-
erence profile for all agents. We may simply use oa1 i oa2 i . . . i oal (resp.,
oa1 ≻i oa2 ≻i . . . ≻i oal) to denote that oaj i oaj+1 (resp., oaj ≻i oaj+1) holds
simultaneously for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1.
When we discuss the utility of an agent or the social welfare, we may also need
to define a value function of agents on objects. Let fi(o) denote the value of object
o for agent i. Then fi(oa) = fi(ob) implies oa =i ob and fi(oa) > fi(ob) implies
oa ≻i ob. Given an assignment σ, the utilitarian social welfare is defined to be∑
i∈N fi(σ(i)).
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Let G = (N,E) be an undirected graph as the social network among agents,
where the edges in E capture the capability of communication and exchange be-
tween two agents inN . An instance of Housing Market is a tuple (N,O,≻, G, σ0)
or (N,O,, G, σ0) according to the preferences being strict or weak.
2.2 Dynamics
The approach we take in this paper is dynamic, and we focus on individually ratio-
nal trades between two agents. A trade is individually rational if each participant
receives an object at least as good as the one currently held, i.e., for two agents i
and j and an assignment σ, the trade between agents i and j on σ is individually
rational if σ(j) i σ(i) and σ(i) j σ(j). Notice that, under strict preferences, a
trade is individually rational if each participant receives an object strictly better
than the one currently held since there are no objects equivalent to any agent.
We require that every trade is performed between neighbors in the social net-
work G. Individually rational trades defined according to G are called swaps. A
swap is an exchange, where two participants have the capability to communicate.
If an assignment σ′ results from applying a swap in assignment σ, then the swap
is uniquely decided by the two assignments and we may use (σ, σ′) to denote the
swap. We may also use a sequence of assignments (σ0, σ1, σ2, . . . , σt) to represent
a sequence of swaps, where σi results from a swap from σi−1 for any i ∈ {1, ..., t}.
An assignment σ′ is reachable if there exists a sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, σ2, ..., σt)
such that σt = σ
′. An object o ∈ O is reachable for an agent i ∈ N if there is a
sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, σ2, ..., σt) such that σt(i) = o. An assignment σ Pareto-
dominates an assignment σ′ if for all i ∈ N , σ(i) i σ
′(i) and there is an agent
j ∈ N such that σ(j) ≻j σ
′(j). An assignment σ is Pareto optimal if σ is not
Pareto-dominated by any other assignment.
2.3 Problems
We mainly consider two problems under our model. The first one is Object
Reachability, which is to check whether an object is reachable for an agent from
the initial endowment via swaps. Another one is Pareto Efficiency, which is to
find a Pareto optimal assignment within all the reachable assignments. Object
Reachability is formally defined below.
Object Reachability (OR)
Instance: (N,O,≻, G, σ0), an agent k ∈ N , and an object ol ∈ O.
Question: Is object ol reachable for agent k?
Note that in Object Reachability, the preferences are strict by default.
When the preferences are weak, we call the problem Weak Object Reachabil-
ity. When the social network is a path P , the corresponding problem is called
(Weak) Object Reachability in paths. For Object Reachability in paths,
an instance will be denoted by I = (N,O,≻, P, σ0, k ∈ N, ol ∈ O), where we as-
sume without loss of generality that l < k. For path structures, we always assume
without loss of generality that the agents are listed as 1, 2, . . . , n on a line from left
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to right with an edge between any two consecutive agents. Below is an example of
Object Reachability in paths.
Example 1 There are four agents. The path structure, preference profile and a
sequence of swaps are given in Figure 1.
P : 1 2 3 4 1 : o2 ≻ o1 ≻ o3 ≻ o4
σ0 : o1 o2 o3 o4 2 : o4 ≻ o3 ≻ o1 ≻ o2
σ1 : o2 o1 o3 o4 3 : o1 ≻ o4 ≻ o3 ≻ o2
σ2 : o2 o3 o1 o4 4 : o3 ≻ o1 ≻ o2 ≻ o4
Fig. 1 An example of four agents on a path
In Figure 1, the initial endowments for agents are denoted by squares within
the preferences. After a swap between agents 1 and 2 from σ0 we get σ1 and after
a swap between agents 2 and 3 from σ1 we get σ2. Object o1 is reachable for agent
3.
Pareto Efficiency is formally defined below, where the preferences are strict
by default. When the preferences are weak, we call the problem Weak Pareto
Efficiency.
Pareto Efficiency (PE)
Instance: (N,O,≻, G, σ0).
Question: To find a Pareto optimal assignment within all the reachable assign-
ments.
3 Object Reachability in Paths
In this section, the preferences are assumed to be strict. Object Reachability is
known to be NP-complete when the network is a tree and polynomial-time solvable
when the network is a star [15]. It is left unsolved whether the problem with the
network being a path is NP-hard or not. We show some properties of Object
Reachability under path structures and design a polynomial-time algorithm for
it. In the remaining part of this section, the network is always assumed to be a
path.
Recall that the problem is to check whether an object ol is reachable for an
agent k with l < k. We introduce the main idea of the algorithm as follows.
1. First, we show that the instance is equivalent to the instance after deleting all
agents (and the corresponding endowed objects) on the left of agent l. Thus,
we can assume the problem is to check whether object o1 is reachable for an
agent k.
2. Second, we prove that if o1 is reachable for agent k then there is an object on′
with n′ ≥ k that must be moved to agent k − 1 in the final assignment. We
show that we can also delete all agents and objects on the right of agent n′ in
the initial endowment. However, we cannot find the agent n′ directly. In our
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algorithm, we will guess n′ by letting it be each possible value between k and
n. For each candidate n′, we get a special instance, called the neat (o1, on′ , k)-
Constrained instance, which contains n′ agents and objects and the goal is
to check whether the first object o1 is reachable for agent k and the last object
on′ is reachable for agent k−1 simultaneously, i.e., whether there is a reachable
assignment σ′ such that σ′(k) = o1 and σ
′(k − 1) = on′ .
3. Third, to solve the original instance, now we turn to solve at most n neat
(o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances. We characterize reachable assignments for
neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances by showing that any two objects must
satisfy some compatible properties.
4. Fourth, based on the compatible properties, we can prove that each object oi
will be moved to either the left or the right side of its original position in a
reachable assignment (i.e., can not stay at its original position), and there is
at most one possible position il for the left side and most one possible position
ir for the right side. Furthermore, we can compute the candidate positions il
and ir in polynomial time.
5. Last, we still need to decide whether to move each object oi to the left or the
right side. (i.e., to decide which of il and ir is the correct position for oi in the
reachable assignment). Since there are at most two possible positions for each
object, we can reduce the problem to the 2-Sat problem and then solve it in
polynomial time by using fast solvers for 2-Sat.
3.1 Basic Properties and Neat Constrained Instances
When the preferences are strict, we have the following observations and lemmas.
Observation 1 Let (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) be a given sequence of swaps and j ∈ N be
an agent. For any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}, it holds that either σi+1(j) = σi(j) or
σi+1(j) ≻j σi(j).
It implies the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) be a given sequence of swaps. For any two integers
i < j in {0, 1, . . . , t} and any agent q ∈ N , if σi(q) = σj(q), then σd(q) = σi(q)
for any integer i ≤ d ≤ j.
Lemma 1 also says that an object will not ‘visit’ an agent twice. This property
is widely used in similar allocation problems under strict preferences.
Next, we analyze properties under the constraint that the social network is a
path. In a swap, an object is moved to the right side if it is moved from agent i to
agent i + 1, and an object is moved to the left side if it is moved from agent i to
agent i− 1. In each swap, one object is moved to the right side and one object is
moved to the left side. We study the tracks of the objects in a feasible assignment
sequence.
Lemma 2 For a sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt), if σ
T
t (oi) = j, then there are
exactly |j− i| swaps including oi. Furthermore, in all the |j− i| swaps, oi is moved
to the right side if i < j, and moved to the left side if i > j.
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Proof First of all, we show that in a sequence of feasible swaps it is impossible for
an object to be moved to the right and also to the left. Assume to the contrary
that an object o is moved in both directions and we will show a contradiction.
Consider two consecutive swaps including o (i.e., there are no swaps including o
between these two swaps) such that o is moved in two opposite directions in the
two swaps. Assume that object o is moved away from agent q after the first swap.
We can see that o will be moved back to agent q after the second swap. Note that
between these two swaps no swap includes o and then o will not be moved between
them. This means object o will visit agent q twice, a contradiction to Lemma 1.
So any object can only move in one direction in a sequence of swaps.
Since each swap including an object can only move the object to the neighbor
position, we know that there are exactly |j− i| swaps including oi that move oi to
the right side if i < j and to the left side if i > j. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3 Let (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) be a sequence of swaps, and oa and ob be two objects
with a < b. Let a′ = σTt (oa) and b
′ = σTt (ob). If a
′ ≤ a or b′ ≥ b, then a′ < b′.
Proof We consider three cases. If a′ ≤ a and b′ ≥ b, then by a < b we get that
a′ ≤ a < b ≤ b′. Next, we assume that a′ ≤ a and b′ < b. By Lemma 2, we know
that both objects oa and ob can only be moved to the left side. If a
′ ≥ b′, by a < b
we know that there must exist a swap including both oa and ob. In this swap, two
objects are moved in two opposite directions, a contradiction to the fact that the
two objects can only be moved to the left side. The last case where a′ > a and
b′ ≥ b can be proved similarly. ⊓⊔
Lemma 1 shows that any object can only be moved in one direction. Lemma 3
shows that when an object is moved to the right side, all objects initially allocated
on the left of it can not be moved to the right of it at any time; when an object is
moved to the left side, all objects initially allocated to the right of it can not be
moved to the left of it at any time.
In fact, if we want to move an object ol to an agent k with k > l, we may not
need to move any object to the left of ol, i.e., objects ol′ with l
′ < l. Equipped
with Lemma 3, we can prove
Lemma 4 If object ol is reachable for agent k, then there is a feasible assignment
sequence (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) such that σ
T
t (ol) = k, and σt(i) = σ0(i) for all i < l if
l ≤ k and for all i > l if l ≥ k.
Proof The result can be derived from Proposition 2 in [15]. The authors give an
algorithm to produce a sequence of swaps, which does not move any objects oi for
all i < l if l ≤ k and for all i > l if l ≥ k. Proposition 2 shows that if object ol is
reachable for agent k then the obtained sequence of swaps is feasible. ⊓⊔
For an instance I = (N,O,≻, P, σ0, k, ol) of Object Reachability in paths
with l < k, let I′ = (N ′, O′,≻′, P ′, σ′0, k, ol) denote the instance obtained from I
by deleting agents {1, 2, . . . , l − 1} and objects {o1, o2, . . . , ol−1}. In other words,
we let N ′ = {l, l + 1, . . . , n}, O′ = {ol, ol+1, . . . , on}, and ≻
′, P ′ and σ′0 be the
corresponding subsets of ≻, P and σ0.
Corollary 1 Object ol is reachable for agent k in the instance I if and only if
object ol is reachable for agent k in the corresponding instance I
′.
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By Corollary 1, we can always assume that the instance of Object Reacha-
bility in paths is to check whether object o1 is reachable for an agent k.
Assume that object o1 is reachable for agent k. For a sequence of swaps
(σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) such that σt(o1) = k, there are exactly k − 1 swaps including
o1, where o1 is moved to the right side according to Lemma 2. The last swap
including o1 is between agent k − 1 and agent k. Let on′ denote the other object
included in the last swap. In other words, after the last swap, agent k− 1 will get
object on′ and agent k will get object o1. Note that on′ is moved to the left side
in this swap. By Lemma 2, we know that object on′ is moved to the left side in
all swaps including on′ . Therefore, we have the following observation.
Observation 2 If there is a reachable assignment σ such that σ(k) = o1 and
σ(k − 1) = on′ , then it holds that n
′ ≥ k.
Definition 1 The (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained problem is to decide whether an in-
stance I of Object Reachability has a reachable assignment σ such that σ(k−
1) = on′ and σ(k) = o1, where n
′ ≥ k.
Our idea is to transform our problem to the (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained problem.
We do not know the value of n′. So we search by letting n′ be each value in
{k, k+ 1, . . . , n}. This will only increase the running time bound by a factor of n.
So we get
Lemma 5 An instance I = (N,O,≻, P, σ0, k, o1) is a yes-instance if and only if
at least one of the (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances for n
′ ∈ {k, k+1, . . . , n} is
a yes-instance.
For an (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance I, we use I−n′ to denote the in-
stance obtained from I by deleting agents {n′ + 1, n′ + 2, . . . , n} and objects
{on′+1, on′+2, . . . , on}.
Lemma 6 An (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance I is a yes-instance if and only
if the corresponding instance I−n′ is a yes-instance.
Proof We prove this lemma by induction on n′. It is clear that the lemma holds
when n′ = 2. Assume that the lemma holds for n′ = n0 − 1. We show that the
lemma also holds for n′ = n0. Let n
′ = n0. When I−n′ is a yes-instance, it is
obvious that I is also a yes-instance since we can use the same sequence of swaps
as the solution to them. Next, we consider the converse direction and assume that
I is a yes-instance. Then there is a sequence of swaps {σ0, σ1, . . . , σt} such that
σt(k − 1) = on0 and σt(k) = o1. We consider the first swap (σr−1, σr) including
object on0 . Since on0 will be moved to agent k − 1 with k − 1 < n0, by Lemma 2
we know that all swaps including on0 will move on0 to the left side. So in the
swap (σr−1, σr), object on0 is also moved to the left side. By Lemma 3, we know
that no object oi with i > n0 is moved to the left of on0 before σr. Let σ
′
r be the
assignments of the first n0 agents in σr. So we do not need to move any objects oi
with i > n0 to get σ
′
r. Now object on0 is at the position n0 − 1. Since the lemma
holds for n′ = n0 − 1, we know that there is a solution (a sequence of swaps) that
does not move any objects oi with i > n0 − 1 from σr to a satisfying assignment.
Such that there is a solution (a sequence of swaps) to I that does not move any
objects oi with i > n0, which is also a solution to I−n′ . ⊓⊔
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By Lemma 6, we can ignore all agents on the right side of n′ in an (o1, on′ , k)-
Constrained instance.
Definition 2 An (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance is called neat if n
′ is the last
agent.
Next, we only consider neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances.
3.2 Characterization of Reachable Assignments
To solve neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances, we will give a full characteriza-
tion of reachable assignments for them, which shows that an assignment is reach-
able if and only if it is compatible (defined in Definition 4). The compatibility
reveals the relation between any two objects in a reachable assignment.
For two integers x and y, we use [x, y] to denote the set of integers between x
and y (including x and y). In the definition, we do not require x ≤ y. So we have
that [x, y]=[y, x].
Consider a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance and an assignment σt such
that σTt (o1) = k and σ
T
t (on′) = k − 1. For any two objects oa and ob, we let
a′ = σTt (oa) and b
′ = σTt (ob).
Note that since we only consider neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances here,
we know that all the objects will move before we get the final assignment where
agent k gets object o1.
Definition 3 The two objects oa and ob are intersected in assignment σt if Q =
[a, a′] ∩ [b, b′] is not an empty set.
There are three kinds of intersections for two objects in an assignment. In the
first two kinds of intersections, the two objects are moved in the same direction,
i.e., (a′−a)(b′−b) > 0. In the last kind of intersections, the two objects are moved
in the two opposite directions, i.e., (a′ − a)(b′ − b) < 0. The following Lemma 7
describes a property of the first two kinds of intersections and Lemma 8 describes
a property of the third kind of intersections.
Lemma 7 Let (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) be a sequence of swaps, and oa and ob be two objects
with 1 ≤ a < b ≤ n. Let a′ = σTt (oa), b
′ = σTt (ob), and Q = [a, a
′]∩ [b, b′]. Assume
that Q 6= ∅.
(a) If a′ > a and b′ > b, then it holds that oa ≻q ob for all q ∈ Q;
(b) If a′ < a and b′ < b, then it holds that ob ≻q oa for all q ∈ Q.
Proof Both objects oa and ob will visit each agent in Q during the sequence of
swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt).
(a) Since b′ > b, by Lemma 3, we know that for each agent q ∈ Q object ob
will visit agent q before object oa. By Observation 1, we know that oa ≻q ob.
(b) Since a′ < a, by Lemma 3, we know that for each agent q ∈ Q object oa
will visit agent q before object ob. By Observation 1, we know that ob ≻q oa. ⊓⊔
See Figure 2 for an illustration of the two kinds of intersections in Lemma 7.
Object Reachability via Swaps under Strict and Weak Preferences 11
1 . . . a . . . b . . . q . . . a′ . . . b′ . . . n
Q
oa ≻q ob
oa ob
(a) The intersection corresponding to the case described in
Lemma 7(a), where a′ > a and b′ > b
1 . . . a′ . . . b′ . . . q . . . a . . . b . . . n
Q
ob ≻q oa
oa ob
(b) The intersection corresponding to the case described in
Lemma 7(b), where a′ < a and b′ < b
Fig. 2 An illustration of the two kinds of intersections in Lemma 7
Lemma 8 Let (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) be a sequence of swaps for a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained
instance such that σTt (o1) = k and σ
T
t (on′) = k − 1, and oa and ob be two objects
with 1 ≤ a < b ≤ n′. Let a′ = σTt (oa) and b
′ = σTt (ob). Assume that a
′ > a, b′ < b
and Q = [a, a′] ∩ [b, b′] 6= ∅. Let Q′ = [a+ 1, a′] ∩ [b, b′].
(a) There is a swap including oa and ob which happens between agent c − 1 and
c, where c = a′ + b′ − k + 1 ∈ Q′;
(b) It holds that ob ≻q oa for all max(a, b
′) ≤ q < c, and oa ≻q ob for all
c ≤ q ≤ min(a′, b).
Proof Since Q 6= ∅, we know that there exists a swap including oa and ob in the
sequence of swaps. We determine the position of this swap. We first consider (a).
By Lemma 2, we know that during the sequence of swaps each object will
be moved in at most one direction. Let ori = σt(i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′. Since
σTt (o1) = k, by Lemma 3 we know that i < ri for all 1 ≤ i < k. Thus objects ori
for all 1 ≤ i < k are moved to the left side. Since σTt (on′) = k−1, by Lemma 3 we
know that i > ri for all k ≤ i ≤ n
′. Thus objects ori for all k ≤ i ≤ n
′ are moved
to the right side.
Since σTt (o1) = k and oa is moved to the right side, by Lemma 3 we know
that a′ ≥ k. By Lemma 3 again, we know that 1 ≤ ri ≤ a for each k ≤ i ≤ a
′.
For each object in {oa+1, . . . , ob}, if it is moved to the right side then it can only
by assigned to agents in {k, k+ 1, . . . , a′} in σt by Lemma 3. So there are exactly
a′− k+1 objects in {oa+1, . . . , ob} that are moved to the right side. Furthermore,
all of them are moved to the right of k − 1 in σt.
Since object ob is moved to the left side from b to b
′, by Lemma 3 we know
that there are exactly b− b′ objects in {o1, . . . , ob} that will be moved to the right
of ob in σt, which are all moved in the right direction. We further show that no
object ox in {o1, . . . , ob} moved in the right direction will stay at the left of b
′ in
σt. Since σ
T
t (on′) = k − 1 and ob is moved to the left side, by Lemma 3 we know
that b′ ≤ k− 1, and all objects that are moved to the right side are at the right of
o1 in σt. If ox exists, then σ
T
t (ox) > k > b
′, which means that ox is moved to the
12 Sen Huang, Mingyu Xiao
right of ob in σt, a contradiction. So there are exactly b− b
′ objects in {o1, . . . , ob}
that are moved to the right side.
By the above two results, we know that the number of objects in {oa+1, . . . , ob}
that are moved in the right direction is b−b′−a′+k−1. Since ob should be swapped
with oa, we know that ob needs to be swapped with all objects in {oa+1, . . . , ob}
that are moved in the right direction. So right before the swap including oa and ob,
object ob is at agent b−(b−b
′−a′+k−1) = a′+b′−k+1. Thus, c = a′+b′−k+1.
We know that (a) holds.
Next, we consider (b). For any agent q such that max(a, b′) ≤ q < c, both
oa and ob will visit it. By Lemma 3, we know that oa will visit q before ob.
By Observation 1, we know that ob ≻q oa. For any agent q such that c ≤ q ≤
min(a′, b), both oa and ob will visit it. By Lemma 3, we know that ob will visit q
before oa. By Observation 1, we know that oa ≻q ob. Thus (b) holds. ⊓⊔
See Figure 3 for an illustration of the intersection in Lemma 8.
1 . . . a . . . b′ . . . c − 1 c . . . a′ . . . b . . . n′
q
ob ≻q oa
q
oa ≻q ob
oa ob
Fig. 3 An illustration of the intersection in Lemma 8, where a′ > a and b′ < b
Based on Lemmas 7 and 8, we give the conditions for assignment σt to be a
feasible assignment.
Definition 4 We say that a pair of objects oa and ob (a < b) are compatible in
assignment σt if they are either not intersected or intersected and satisfying one
of the following:
1. when a′ > a and b′ > b, it holds that a′ < b′ (corresponding to Lemma 3) and
oa ≻q ob for all agents q ∈ Q (corresponding to Lemma 7(a));
2. when a′ < a and b′ < b, it holds that a′ < b′ (corresponding to Lemma 3) and
ob ≻q oa for all agents q ∈ Q (corresponding to Lemma 7(b));
3. when a′ > a and b′ < b, it holds that c = a′ + b′ − k + 1 ∈ Q′ = Q \ {a},
ob ≻q oa for all max(a, b
′) ≤ q < c, and oa ≻q ob for all c ≤ q ≤ min(a
′, b)
(corresponding to Lemma 8).
Definition 5 An assignment σt is compatible if it holds that σt(i) 6= oi for any
agent i and any pair of objects in it are compatible.
Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 imply that
Lemma 9 If σt is a reachable assignment for a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained
instance such that σTt (o1) = k and σ
T
t (on′) = k − 1, then σt is compatible.
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Proof If there is an agent i such that i ≤ k (resp., i ≥ k) and σ(i) = oi, then by
Observation 1 we know that agent i does not participate in any swap and then
object o1 cannot go to agent k (resp., object on′ cannot go to agent k − 1) since
only two adjacent agents can participate in a swap. So σ(i) 6= oi holds for any
agent i.
For any pair of intersected objects oa and ob, there are only three cases that
are corresponding to the three items in Definition 4. By Lemma 7 and Lemma 8,
we know that they must be compatible. ⊓⊔
Lemma 10 Let σt be a compatible assignment for a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained
instance such that σTt (o1) = k and σ
T
t (on′) = k− 1. For any two objects ox−1 and
ox, if σ
T
t (ox−1) > x− 1 and σ
T
t (ox) < x, then the swap between agents x− 1 and
x in σ0 is feasible. Let σ1 denote the assignment after the swap between x− 1 and
x in σ0. Then σt is still compatible by taking σ1 as the initial endowment.
Proof Consider the two objects ox−1 and ox, where ox−1 is moved in the right
direction and ox is moved in the left direction. They are compatible. By item 3 in
the definition of the compatibility, we know that c = x, which implies the swap
between agents x− 1 and x is feasible in σ0.
Next, we show that if we take σ1 as the initial endowment, the assignment σt
is still compatible. Compared with σ0, the endowment positions of two objects are
changed. To check whether σt is compatible with σ1 (being the initial endowment),
we only need to check the compatibility of object pairs involving at least one of
the two objects ox−1 and ox.
Now σ1(x− 1) = ox, σ1(x) = ox−1 and σ1(i) = oi for all other i /∈ {x− 1, x}.
First, we consider object pair ox and an object oi with i ≥ x. If ox and oi are
intersected, then the intersection can only be the case described in Lemma 7(b).
Item 2 in the definition of compatibility will hold because only the value of a
changes to a smaller value from x to x− 1 and the domain of Q will not increase.
Second, we consider object pair ox and an object oi with 1 ≤ i ≤ x − 2.
If ox and oi are intersected, there are two possible cases. When σt(oi) < i, the
intersection will be the case described in Lemma 7(b). Item 2 in the definition
of compatibility will still hold because only the value of b changes to a smaller
value from x to x− 1 and the domain of Q will not increase. When σt(oi) > i, the
intersection will be the case described in Lemma 8. We show that item 3 in the
definition of compatibility will hold. The value of c for oa = oi and ob = ox is the
same no matter taking σ0 or σ1 as the initial endowment, since none of a
′, b′ and
k is changed. Note that when taking σ0 as the initial endowment the value of c is
x for oa = ox−1 and ob = ox. If the value of c is also x for oa = oi and ob = ox
(i 6= x−1), then we will get a contradiction that both ox−1 and oi will be assigned
to the same agent in σt by the computation formula of c. So we know that c 6= x
for oa = oi and ob = ox. Thus, we get c ∈ Q
′ = [i + 1, σTt (oi)] ∩ [σ
T
t (ox), x − 1]
because c ∈ Q = [i+, σTt (oi)] ∩ [σ
T
t (ox), x] by σt being compatible with σ0 and
c 6= x. After taking σ1 as the initial endowment, the values of a, a
′, c and b′ will
not change, and the value of b changes from x to a smaller value x−1. We can see
that the follows still hold: ob ≻q oa for all max(a, b
′) ≤ q < c, and oa ≻q ob for all
c ≤ q ≤ min(a′, b).
Third, we consider ox−1 and an object oi with 1 ≤ i ≤ x−1. If ox−1 and oi are
intersected, then the intersection can only be the case described in Lemma 7(a).
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Item 1 in the definition of compatibility will still hold because only the value of b
changes to a bigger value from x− 1 to x and the domain of Q will not increase.
Fourth, we consider ox−1 and an object oi with i ≥ x. If ox−1 and oi are
intersected, there are two possible cases. When σt(oi) > i, the intersection will be
the case described in Lemma 7(a). Item 1 in the definition of compatibility will
still hold because only the value of a changes to a bigger value from x−1 to x and
the domain of Q will not increase. When σt(oi) < i, the intersection will be the
case described in Lemma 8. Analogously, we use similar arguments for the second
case, we can prove that item 3 in the definition of compatibility holds.
So if σt is compatible by taking σ0 as the initial endowment, then it is com-
patible by taking σ1 as the initial endowment. ⊓⊔
Based on Lemma 10 we will prove the following lemma.
Lemma 11 Let σt be an assignment for a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance
such that σTt (o1) = k and σ
T
t (on′) = k−1. If σt is compatible, then σt is a reachable
assignment.
Proof We show that we can find a sequence of swaps from σ0 to σt for each
compatible assignment σt. In our algorithm, we first move object σt(1) from its
current position to agent 1, then move object σt(2) to agent 2, and so on. A formal
description of the procedure is that: For i from 1 to k− 1, move object σt(i) from
its current position to agent i by a sequence of swaps including it (if the current
position of σt(i) is agent j, then it is a sequence of |j − i| swaps). To prove the
correctness of the algorithm, we need to show that each swap in the algorithm is
feasible and finally we can get the assignment σt.
First, we show that the first loop of the algorithm can be executed legally, i.e.,
σt(1) can be moved to agent 1 by a sequence of swaps. The first swap between
agents x − 1 and x in σ0 is feasible by Lemma 10. We use σ1 to denote the
assignment after this swap in σ0. Then σt is compatible by taking σ1 as the initial
endowment by Lemma 10. By applying Lemma 10 iteratively, we know that the
swap between agents x−1− i and x− i in σi is feasible (for i > 0). We use σi+1 to
denote the assignment after the swap in σi and assume that object ox is assigned
to agent 1 in σt1 . By Lemma 10, we know that the sequence of swaps from σ0 to
σt1 are feasible and σt is compatible by taking σt1 as the initial endowment.
Next, we consider σt1 as the initial endowment. Agent 1 has already gotten
object ox and we can ignore it. After deleting agent 1 and object ox from the
instance, we get a new (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance. The second loop of the
algorithm is indeed to move the corresponding object to the first agent in the new
instance. So the correctness of the second loop directly follows from the above
argument for the first loop.
By iteratively applying the above arguments, we can prove that each loop of
the algorithm can be executed legally. Therefore, all swaps in the algorithm are
feasible.
Let σt′ be the assignment returned by the algorithm. It holds that σt′(i) = σt(i)
for i ≤ k − 1. For i ≥ k, we show that σt′ (i) = σt(i) still holds. For any object
oj = σt′(i) with i ≥ k, objects oj and on′ are intersected and the intersection can
only be the case described in Lemma 8. By item 3 in the definition of compatibility,
we know the value c will not change no matter what the endowment position of oj
is. Thus, oj and on′ will be swapped between two fixed agents and this is the last
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swap including oj . Object oj will arrive at the position a
′ = σTt (oj). Therefore,
σt′ = σt. ⊓⊔
By Lemmas 9 and 11, to solve a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance, we
only need to find a compatible assignment for it.
3.3 Computing Compatible Assignments
In a compatible assignment, object o1 will be assigned to agent k and object on′
will be assigned to agent k−1. We consider other objects oi for i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n
′−1}.
In a compatible assignment, object oi will not be assigned to agent i since each
agent will participate in at least one swap including object o1 or on′ . There are
two possible cases: oi is assigned to agent i
′ such that i′ < i; oi is assigned to
agent i′ such that i′ > i. We say that oi is moved to the left side for the former
case and moved to the right side for the latter case. We will show that for each
direction, there is at most one possible position for each object oi in a compatible
assignment.
First, we consider i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , k − 1}. Assume that object oi is moved to
the left side in a compatible assignment. Thus, o1 and oi are intersected and the
intersection is of the case described in Lemma 8. We check whether there is an
index i′ such that i′ ≤ i, oi ≻i′−1 o1 and o1 ≻j oi for each j ∈ {i
′, i′ + 1, . . . , i}.
The index i′ is also corresponding to the index c in Lemma 8. We can see that
i′ is the only possible agent for object oi to make o1 and oi compatible if oi is
moved to the left side. We use il to denote this agent i
′ if it exists for i. Assume
that object oi is moved to the right side in a compatible assignment. Since o1 will
be moved to agent k and oi will be moved to the right side, by Lemma 3 we know
that oi will be moved to the right of o1, i.e., an agent i
′′ with i′′ > k. Thus, oi
and on′ are intersected and the intersection is of the case described in Lemma 8.
We check whether there is an index i′ such that i′ > k, oi ≻i′ on′ and on′ ≻j oi
for each j ∈ {k− 1, k, . . . , i′ − 1}. We can see that i′ is the only possible agent for
object oi to make on′ and oi compatible if oi is moved to the right side. We use
ir to denote this agent i
′ if it exists for i.
Second, we consider i ∈ {k, k + 1, . . . , n′ − 1}. In fact, the structure of neat
(o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances is symmetrical. We can rename the agents on
the path from left to right as {n′, n′ − 1, . . . , 1} instead of {1, 2, . . . , n′} and then
this case becomes the above case. We can compute il and ir for each i ∈ {k, k +
1, . . . , n′ − 1} similarly.
The procedure to compute il and ir for each agent i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n
′ − 1} in a
neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance is presented as the following.
If none of il and ir exists for some i, then this instance is a no-instance. If
only one of il and ir exists, then object oi must be assigned to this agent in any
compatible assignment. The hardest case is that both il and ir exist, where we may
not know which agent the object will be assigned to in the compatible assignment.
In this case, we will rely on algorithms for 2-Sat to find possible solutions.
For each agent j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n′}, we will use Rj to store all possible ob-
jects that may be assigned to agent j in a compatible assignment. The following
procedure computes the initial Rj .
1. Initially, let Rk−1 = {on′}, Rk = {o1}, and Ri = ∅ for all other agent i.
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Algorithm 1: To compute il and ir
1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n′ − 1 do
2 if there exists i′ such that i′ ≤ i, oi ≻i′−1 o1 and o1 ≻j oi for each
j ∈ {i′, i′ + 1, . . . , i} then
3 let il = i
′;
4 else
5 let il =⊥ to indicate that il does not exist.
6 if there exists i′ such that i′ > k, oi ≻i′ on′ and on′ ≻j oi for each
j ∈ {k − 1, k, . . . , i′ − 1} then
7 let ir = i′;
8 else
9 let ir =⊥ to indicate that ir does not exist.
2. For each i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n′ − 1}, compute il and ir by Algorithm 1, and add oi
to Ril if il 6=⊥ (resp., to Rir if ir 6=⊥).
We also use the following two steps to iteratively update Rj and then make
the size of Rj at most 2 for each j.
1. If there is an empty set Rj0 for an agent j0, stop and report the instance is a
no-instance;
2. If there is a set Rj0 containing only one object oi0 and the object oi0 appears
in two sets Rj0 and Rj′0 , then delete oi0 from Rj′0 .
The correctness of the second step is based on the fact that agent j0 should
get one object. If there is only one candidate object oi0 for agent j0, then oi0 can
only be assigned to agent j0 in any compatible assignment.
We also analyze the running time of the above procedure to compute all Rj .
Algorithm 1 computes il and ir in O(n) for each object oi. Therefore, we use O(n
2)
time to set the initial values for all sets Rj . To update Ri, we may execute at most
n iterations and each iteration can be executed in O(n). Hence, the procedure to
compute all Rj runs in time O(n
2).
Lemma 12 After the above procedure, either the instance is a no-instance or it
holds that 1 ≤ |Rj | ≤ 2 for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n
′}.
Proof We only need to consider the latter case where each set Rj contains at least
one object after the procedure. Note that for each set Rj which contains only one
object, the object will not appear in any other set. We ignore these singletons Rj
and consider the remaining sets. Each remaining set contains at least two objects.
On the other hand, each other object oi (not appearing in a singleton) can be in
at most two sets Ril and Rir . On average each remaining set Rj contains at most
two objects. Therefore, each remaining set Rj contains exactly two objects. ⊓⊔
For a set Rj containing only one object oi, we know that object oi should
be assigned to agent j in any compatible assignment. For sets Rj containing two
objects, we still need to decide which object is assigned to this agent such that we
can get a compatible assignment.
We will reduce the remaining problem to 2-Sat. The 2-Sat instance contains
n′ variables {x1, x2, . . . , xn′} corresponding to the n
′ objects. When xi = 1, it
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means that object oi is moved to the right side, i.e, we will assign it to agent ir
in the compatible assignment. When xi = 0, it means that object oi is moved to
the left side and we will assign it to agent il in the compatible assignment. In the
2-Sat instance, we have two kinds of clauses, called agent clauses and compatible
clauses.
For each set Rj , we associate |Rj | literals with it. If there is an object oi such
that il = j, we associate literal xi with Rj ; if there is an object oi such that ir = j,
we associate literal xi with Rj . For each set Rj of size 1 (let the associated literal
be ℓj), we construct one clause cj containing only one literal ℓj . For each set Rj of
size 2 (let the associated literals be ℓ1j and ℓ
2
j ), we construct two clauses cj1 : ℓ
1
j ∨ℓ
2
j
and cj2 : ℓ1j ∨ ℓ
2
j . These clauses are called agent clauses. From the construction, we
can see that both of the two clauses cj1 and cj2 are satisfied if and only if exactly
one object is assigned to agent j. The agent clauses can guarantee that exactly
one object is assigned to each agent.
For each pair of sets Rj and Ri, we construct several clauses according to the
definition of compatibility. For any two objects oj′ ∈ Rj (the corresponding literal
associated with Rj is ℓj) and oi′ ∈ Ri (the corresponding literal associated with
Ri is ℓi), we say that ℓj and ℓi are compatible if oj′ and oi′ are compatible when oj′
is assigned to agent j and oi′ is assigned to agent i in the assignment. If ℓj and ℓi
are not compatible, then either oj′ cannot be assigned to agent j or oi′ cannot be
assigned to agent i in any compatible assignment. So we construct one compatible
clause: ℓj ∨ ℓi for each pair of incompatible pair ℓj and ℓi. We can see that if the
compatible clause ℓj ∨ ℓi is satisfied if and only if either oj′ is not assigned to
agent j or oi′ is not assigned to agent i. Since we construct a compatible clause
for any possible incompatible pair, we know that all the compatible clauses are
satisfied if and only if there is not incompatible pair in the assignment. Note that,
for each pair of sets Rj and Ri, we will create at most 2×2 = 4 compatible clauses
since each of Rj and Ri contains at most 2 elements. Therefore, the number of
compatible clauses in O(n2).
By Lemma 12, we know that there are at most two candidate objects for each
agent in a compatible assignment. Thus, each agent clause contains at most two
literals. By the construction of compatible clauses, we know that each compati-
ble clause contains exactly two literals. So, the constructed instance is a 2-Sat
instance. The construction of the 2-Sat instance implies the following lemma.
Lemma 13 The neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance has a compatible assign-
ment if and only if the corresponding 2-Sat instance constructed above has a
satisfiable assignment.
Proof First of all, we show that if the neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance has a
compatible assignment then the 2-Sat instance is satisfiable. Let σ be a compatible
assignment of the neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance. By the definition of
compatible assignments, we know that each object is either moved to the left or
the right in the path (cannot stay at its initial position) in the assignment σ. If
object oi is moved to the left we let the corresponding variable xi = 0 in the 2-Sat
instance, and if object oi is moved to the right we let the corresponding variable
xi = 1. Thus, we assign values for all variables. Since each agent gets exactly one
object in the compatible assignment σ, we know that all the agent clauses are
satisfied. Furthermore, σ(i) and σ(j) are compatible for any pair of agents i and j
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in the compatible assignment σ, and then all compatible clauses are satisfied. So
the 2-Sat instance is satisfiable.
Next, we consider the other direction. LetΠ be a satisfying assignment of the 2-
Sat instance. We construct an assignment σ′ of the neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained
instance: if variable xi is assigned 1 in Π, let σ
′(ir) = oi, and let σ
′(il) = oi oth-
erwise. We show that σ′ is a compatible assignment. First, each object is assigned
to an agent different from its initial agent since each variable has been assigned
to 1 or 0. Second, each agent only gets one object, because all the agent clauses
are satisfied. Last, any pair of objects are compatible, because all the compatible
clauses are satisfied. Such assignment σ′ is compatible. ⊓⊔
3.4 The Whole Algorithm
The main steps of the whole algorithm to solve Object Reachability in paths
are listed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Main steps of the whole algorithm
Input: An instance (N,O,≻, P, σ, k ∈ N, o1 ∈ O)
Output: To determine whether o1 is reachable for k
1 for each n′ ∈ {k, k + 1, . . . , n} do
2 Construct the corresponding neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance by deleting
agent i and object oi for all n′ < i ≤ n;
3 Compute ir and il for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n
′ − 1 by Algorithm 1;
4 Compute and update Rj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n
′ by the procedure before Lemma 12;
5 Construct the corresponding 2-Sat instance according to Rj by the construction
method introduced before Lemma 13;
6 if the 2-Sat instance is a yes-instance then
7 return yes and quit;
8 return no.
The correctness of the algorithm follows from Corollary 1, Lemma 5, Lemma 6
and Lemma 13. Corollary 1 says that we can simply reduce the problem to
check whether o1 is reachable for an agent. Then Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 im-
ply that the original instance is a yes-instance if and only if one of the corre-
sponding neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances is a yes-instance. Lemma 13
says that to solve a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance, we only need to
solve the corresponding 2-Sat instance. So we solve all the O(n) correspond-
ing neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances for n
′ ∈ {k, k + 1, . . . , n} by using
2-Sat solvers, and the algorithm returns yes when one of the corresponding neat
(o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances is a yes-instance.
Next, we analyze the running time bound of the algorithm. The major part of
the algorithm is to solve O(n) neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances. To solve
a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance, the above arguments show that we use
O(n2) time to compute all sets Rj . To construct the corresponding 2-Sat instance,
we construct at most 2n agent clauses in O(n) time and construct at most 4
(
n
2
)
compatible clauses, each of which will take O(n) time to check the compatibility.
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So the 2-Sat instance can be constructed in O(n3) time. We use the O(n +m)-
time algorithm for 2-Sat [23] to solve the instance, where m is the number of
clauses and in our instances, it holds that m = O(n2). Thus, we can solve each
neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance in O(n
3) time. In total, the algorithm uses
O(n4) time to compute all the O(n) neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instances.
Theorem 1 Object Reachability in paths can be solved in O(n4) time.
We give an example to show the steps to compute a compatible assignment for
a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance.
Example 2 Consider a neat (o1, on′ , k)-Constrained instance with n
′ = 8 and
k = 5 as shown in Figure 4.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 : o2 ≻ o8 ≻ o7 ≻ o1
2 : o5 ≻ o3 ≻ o4 ≻ o1 ≻ o8 ≻ o2
3 : o6 ≻ o4 ≻ o1 ≻ o8 ≻ o5 ≻ o3
4 : o8 ≻ o1 ≻ o6 ≻ o3 ≻ o2 ≻ o7 ≻ o5 ≻ o4
5 : o1 ≻ o8 ≻ o3 ≻ o7 ≻ o6 ≻ o4 ≻ o2 ≻ o5
6 : o3 ≻ o2 ≻ o5 ≻ o8 ≻ o4 ≻ o6
7 : o4 ≻ o6 ≻ o2 ≻ o8 ≻ o1 ≻ o3 ≻ o7
8 : o7 ≻ o3 ≻ o5 ≻ o4 ≻ o1 ≻ o8
Fig. 4 The instance of Example 2
We compute ir and il for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′ by Algorithm 1, the values of which
are listed in Table 2.
Table 2 The values of il and ir
Agent i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
il ⊥ 1 2 3 2 3 ⊥ 4
ir 5 6 6 7 6 7 8 ⊥
According to the values in Table 2, we compute and update Rj for j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n′} by the procedure before Lemma 12. After the update, it holds that
1 ≤ |Rj | ≤ 2 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n
′. The values of Rj before and after updating are
shown in the second and third columns of Table 3.
Next, we construct the corresponding 2-Sat instance according to updated
Rj . The 2-Sat instance contains eight variables x1, x2, . . . , x8 corresponding to
the eight objects. There are two kinds of clauses: agents clauses and compatible
clauses.
Agent clauses are easy to construct: if Rj contains only one object oq, we
construct one clause of a single literal xq if q < j and one clause of a single literal
xq if q > j; if Rj contains two objects oq and op, we construct two clauses of two
literals according to our algorithm to constrain that exactly one object is assigned
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Table 3 Initial and updated Rj and agent clauses
Sets Initial Rj Updated Rj Agent clauses
R1 {o2} {o2} x2
R2 {o3, o5} {o3, o5} x3 ∨ x5, x3 ∨ x5
R3 {o4, o6} {o4, o6} x4 ∨ x6, x4 ∨ x6
R4 {o8} {o8} x8
R5 {o1} {o1} x1
R6 {o2, o3, o5} {o3, o5} x3 ∨ x5, x3 ∨ x5
R7 {o4, o6} {o4, o6} x4 ∨ x6, x4 ∨ x6
R8 {o7} {o7} x7
to agent j. The agent clauses for each set Rj are shown in the last column of
Table 3.
We construct compatible clauses for all incompatible pairs. We check all pairs
of objects and find that there are only two incompatible cases: o4 and o5 are
incompatible if o4 and o5 are moved to agent 3 and agent 2, respectively; o4 and
o5 are incompatible if o4 and o5 are moved to agent 7 and agent 6, respectively.
So we construct the corresponding compatible clauses according to our algorithm
and the compatible clauses are
x4 ∨ x5 and x4 ∨ x5.
By using the O(n + m) time algorithm for 2-Sat [23], we get a feasible as-
signment (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) for the 2-Sat instance. The solution to the 2-Sat
instance indicates that objects {o1, o5, o6, o7} are moved to the right side and the
final positions for them are {5, 6, 7, 8}; objects {o2, o3, o4, o8} are moved to the left
side and the final positions for them are {1, 2, 3, 4}. The corresponding compatible
assignment is (o2, o3, o4, o8, o1, o5, o6, o7), i.e., σ7 shown in Figure 5.
To obtain the corresponding sequence of feasible swaps from σ0 to σ7, we use
the algorithm in the proof of Lemma 11. We first move object o2 to agent 1, then
object o3 to agent 2, then object o4 to agent 3, and finally object o8 to agent 4.
The sequence of swaps is shown in Figure 5.
σ0 : o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7 o8
σ1 : o2 o1 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7 o8
σ2 : o2 o3 o1 o4 o5 o6 o7 o8
σ3 : o2 o3 o4 o1 o5 o6 o7 o8
σ4 : o2 o3 o4 o1 o5 o6 o8 o7
σ5 : o2 o3 o4 o1 o5 o8 o6 o7
σ6 : o2 o3 o4 o1 o8 o5 o6 o7
σ7 : o2 o3 o4 o8 o1 o5 o6 o7
P : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Fig. 5 The sequence of swaps to reach the compatible assignment for Example 2
Remark: Although the algorithm will compute two possible values il and ir
for each i, it does not mean that object oi must be reachable for both il and ir.
In the above example, object o2 is not reachable for agent 2r = 6 since agent 3
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prefers its initially endowed object o3 to o2 and then o2 cannot go to the right
side. In our algorithm, the compatible clauses can avoid assigning an object to an
unreachable value il or ir. In the above example, if object o2 goes to agent 6, then
some object oi with i > 2 will go to agent 1 or 2 and we will get an incompatible
pair o2 and oi.
4 Weak Preference Version in Paths
We have proved that Object Reachability in paths is polynomial-time solvable.
Next, we show that Weak Object Reachability in paths is NP-hard. One of
the most important properties is that Lemma 1 does not hold for Weak Object
Reachability and an object may ‘visit’ an agent more than once. Our proof
involves a similar high-level idea as that of the NP-hardness proof for Object
Reachability in a tree by Gourve`s et al. [15].
The NP-hardness is proved by a reduction from the known NP-complete prob-
lem 2P1N-SAT [24]. In a 2P1N-SAT instance, we are given a set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
of variables and a set C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} of clauses over V such that every vari-
able occurs 3 times in C with 2 positive literals and 1 negative literal. The question
is to check whether there is a variable assignment satisfying C. For a 2P1N-SAT
instance ISAT , we construct an instance IWOR of Weak Object Reachability
in paths such that ISAT is a yes-instance if and only if IWOR is a yes-instance.
Instance IWOR contains 6n+m+1 agents and objects, which are constructed
as follows. There is an agent named T . For each clause Ci (i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}), we
introduce an agent also named Ci. For each variable vi, we add six agents, named
as X
ni
i , X
pi
i , X
qi
i , A
3
i , A
2
i and A
1
i . They form a path of length 5 in this order. The
path is called a block and is denoted by Bi. See Figure 6. The names of the six
agents have certain meaning: X
ni
i means that the negative literal of vi appears in
clause Cni ; X
pi
i and X
qi
i mean that the positive literals of vi appear in the two
clauses Cpi and Cqi ; A
3
i , A
2
i and A
1
i are three auxiliary agents.
X
ni
i
X
pi
i
X
qi
i
A3
i
A2
i
A1
i
Fig. 6 Block Bi
The whole path is connected in the order shown in Figure 7.
Bn . . . B1 Cm . . . C1 T
Fig. 7 The structure of the whole path
In the initial assignment σ0, object t is assigned to agent T , object ci is assigned
to agent Ci for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, object a
j
i is assigned to agent A
j
i for each i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and onii (resp., o
pi
i and o
qi
i ) is assigned to agent X
ni
i
(resp., Xpii and X
qi
i ) for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
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Next, we define the preference profile . We only show the objects that each
agent prefers at least as its initial one and all other objects can be put behind
its initial endowment in any order. Let Li be the set of the objects associated
with the literals in clause Ci. For example, Li is the object set {o
na
a , o
pb
b , o
qc
c } with
na = i, pb = i and qc = i. The set Li will have the following property: in a
reachable assignment, one object in Li will be assigned to agent Ci, which will be
corresponding to the true literal in the clause Ci in the 2P1N-SAT instance ISAT .
For each variable vi, we use Wi to denote the set of objects {c1, . . . , cm} ∪ {o
nj
j :
j > i} ∪ {o
pj
j : j 6= i} ∪ {o
qj
j : j > i} ∪ {a
l
j : j < i, l = 1, 2, 3}. We are ready to give
the preferences for the agents.
First, we consider the preferences for T and Ci. The following preferences en-
sure that when Ci holds an object in Li for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, object t is reach-
able for agent Cm via a sequence ofm swaps between Ci and Ci−1 for i = 1, . . . ,m,
where C0 = T . Note that the squares in the preferences indicate the initial endow-
ments for agents.
T : L1 ≻ t ;
Ci : Li+1 ≻ t ≻ Li ≻ c1 ≻ Li−1 ≻ . . . ≻ ci−1 ≻ L1 ≻ ci , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 ;
Cm : t ≻ Lm ≻ c1 ≻ Lm−1 ≻ . . . ≻ cm−1 ≻ L1 ≻ cm .
Next, we consider the preferences for the agents in each block Bi. The following
preferences ensure that at most one of onii and {o
pi
i , o
qi
i } can be moved to the right
of the block, which will indicate that the corresponding variable is set to 1 or 0.
If onii is moved to the right of the block, we will assign the corresponding variable
0; if some of {opii , o
qi
i } is moved to the right of the block, we will assign the corre-
sponding variable 1. We use the preference of A3i to control this. Furthermore, we
use A1i , A
2
i and A
3
i to (temporarily) hold o
ni
i (or o
pi
i and o
qi
i ) if they do not need
to be moved to the right of the block.
X
ni
i : Wi ∪ {a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , o
pi
i , o
qi
i } ≻ o
ni
i ,
Xqii :Wi ∪ {a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , o
ni
i , o
pi
i } ≻ o
qi
i ,
Xpii :Wi ∪ {a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , o
qi
i , o
ni
i } ≻ o
pi
i ,
A1i :Wi ∪ { a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , o
pi
i , o
qi
i , o
ni
i } ,
A2i :Wi ∪ {a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , o
pi
i , o
qi
i , o
ni
i } ,
A3i :Wi ∪ {a
1
i , a
2
i , o
pi
i , o
qi
i } ≻ o
ni
i ≻ a
3
i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Instance IWOR is to determine whether object t is reachable for agent Cm.
Lemma 14 A 2P1N-SAT instance ISAT is a yes-instance if and only if the cor-
responding instance IWOR of Weak Object Reachability in paths constructed
above is a yes-instance.
Proof First, we prove that a reachable assignment of IWOR implies a satisfying
assignment for ISAT . Assume that object t is reachable for agent Cm. Then there
arem swaps including t that happen between Ci and Ci+1 for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−1},
where C0 = T . Note that the swap between Ci and Ci+1 (where Ci holds object
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t) can happen if and only if Ci+1 holds an object a ∈ Li+1. We will prove the
claim that for each block Bi, it is impossible that both o
ni
i and one of o
pi
i and o
qi
i
are moved to the right of this block. By this claim, we can see that a satisfying
assignment for ISAT can be obtained by letting the literal corresponding to the
object a ∈ Li to 1 for all agents Ci.
Next, we prove the claim that for each block Bi, it is impossible that both
onii and one of o
pi
i and o
qi
i are moved to the right of this block. Assume to the
contrary that there is a block Bi such that both o
ni
n and one of o
pi
i and o
qi
i are
moved to the right of this block. When onkk is moved to the right of this block,
it must reach A3k at some time. We know that o
ni
i is the last but one in agent
A3i ’s given preferences. This implies that before o
ni
i is swapped with a
3
i between
Xqii and A
3
i , A
3
i cannot participate in any other swap. Therefore, the only way to
move onkk to A
3
i is that o
nk
k is swapped with o
pi
i , o
qi
i and a
3
i in this order. For each
agent of {X
ni
i , X
pi
i , X
qi
i }, once its endowment object is swapped with an object,
the endowment object will not come back to the agent again. Thus, both opii and
oqii cannot be moved to the right of this block, which is a contradiction.
On the other hand, if there is a satisfying assignment τ for ISAT , we can
construct a reachable assignment for IWOR. We consider the value of each variable
vi in τ . If vi = 1, we move o
pi
i and o
qi
i to agents A
3
i and A
2
i , respectively. The
sequence of swaps is shown in Figure 8. If vi = 0, we move o
ni
i to agent A
2
i . The
sequence of swaps is shown in Figure 9. Note that for any case, all the swaps
happen within a block. The objects opii , o
qi
i and o
ni
i in the above procedure are
called true objects.
X
ni
i
X
pi
i
X
qi
i
A3
i
A2
i
A1
i
x
ni
i
x
pi
i
x
qi
i a
3
i
a2
i
a1
i
x
ni
i
x
pi
i a
3
i
x
qi
i a
2
i
a1
i
x
ni
i
x
pi
i a
3
i
a2
i
x
qi
i a
1
i
x
ni
i a
3
i
x
pi
i a
2
i
x
qi
i a
1
i
x
ni
i a
3
i
a2
i
x
pi
i
x
qi
i a
1
i
Fig. 8 The sequences of swaps to move opi
i
and oqi
i
to agents A3
i
and A2
i
, respectively
X
ni
i
X
pi
i
X
qi
i
A3
i
A2
i
A1
i
x
ni
i
x
pi
i
x
qi
i a
3
i
a2
i
a1
i
x
pi
i
x
ni
i a
3
i
x
qi
i a
2
i
a1
i
x
pi
i
x
qi
i
x
ni
i a
3
i
a2
i
a1
i
x
pi
i
x
qi
i a
3
i
x
ni
i a
2
i
a1
i
x
pi
i
x
qi
i a
3
i
a2
i
x
ni
i a
1
i
Fig. 9 The sequences of swaps to move oni
i
to agent A2
i
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After this procedure, we move only one of true objects in Lj to each agent
Cj one by one in an order where Cj with smaller j first gets its object in Lj (for
every agent in blocks, almost all objects in her given preferences are indifferent
with each other). During this procedure, once another true object is moved out
of its position A3i or A
2
i (this may happen when the true object is on the moving
path of another true object to Cj′ with j < j
′), we will simply move it back to A3i
or A2i by one swap. We can do this swap because almost all objects except o
ni
i and
a3i are equivalent for A
3
i , A
2
i and A
1
i . So in each iteration, only one true object is
moved out of its current position A3i or A
2
i and it is moved to its final position Cj
directly. Note that Ci+1 holds an object a ∈ Li+1 for i from 0 to m− 1 now and
C0 = T holds the object t. We make a swap between Ci and Ci+1 for i from 0 to
m− 1, and then the object t will be moved to agent Cm. ⊓⊔
Lemma 14 implies that
Theorem 2 Weak Object Reachability is NP-hard even when the network is
a path.
The above reduction from 2P1N-SAT can also be used to prove the NP-
hardness of Weak Pareto Efficiency and the problem of maximizing the util-
itarian social welfare. We will use the following lemma.
Lemma 15 For the above instance IWOR constructed from the 2P1N-SAT in-
stance ISAT , if IWOR is a yes-instance, then there is a reachable assignment σ
where every agent holds one of its most favorite objects.
Proof Let σ be a reachable assignment in the above instance IWOR such that
σ(Cm) = t. Clearly, each agent Ci for i ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m} must holds one of its
favorite objects. Form the construction of the preference profile, we know that
A1i and A
2
i must hold their favorite objects respectively for every i. If σ(A
3
i ) is
not one of the favorite objects of A3i , then one of σ(A
2
i ) and σ(A
1
i ) is one of the
favorite objects of A3i and it can be swapped to A
3
i directly. Let X be one of X
ni
i ,
Xqii and X
pi
i such that σ(X) is not one of the favorite objects of X and let Y
be a neighbor of X in {X
ni
i , X
qi
i , X
pi
i }. Then, we have that σ(X) Y σ(Y ) and
σ(Y ) X σ(X). We make a swap between X and Y now. So, we can always get a
reachable assignment σ′ such that each agent holds one of its favorite objects in
σ′ resulting from σ. ⊓⊔
By this lemma, we know that if IWOR is a yes-instance, then in any Pareto
optimal assignment for IWOR every agent holds one of its most favorite objects.
On the other hand, if there is a Pareto optimal assignment where every agent holds
one of its most favorite objects, then Cm must hold t. Thus the above reduction
also reduces 2P1N-SAT to Weak Pareto Efficiency in paths. The instance
IWOR has a Pareto optimal assignment such that every agent holds one of its most
favorite objects if and only if the 2P1N-SAT instance ISAT is a yes-instance.
Theorem 3 Weak Pareto Efficiency is NP-hard even when the network is a
path.
Next, we discuss the problem of maximizing the utilitarian social welfare. In
this problem, we will associate a value function fi(·) on the objects for each agent i.
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For any two objects oa and ob, the value function holds that fi(oa) > fi(ob) if and
only if oa ≻i ob (resp., fi(oa) = fi(ob) if and only if oa =i ob). Thus, each agent
has the maximum value on the most favorite objects. By Lemma 15, in the above
instance IWOR, all agents get their maximum value, i.e., the utilitarian social
welfare is maximum, if and only if the 2P1N-SAT instance ISAT is a yes-instance.
Theorem 4 Finding a reachable assignment that maximizes the utilitarian social
welfare is NP-hard even when the network is a path.
5 Weak Preference Version in Stars
In this section, we assume that the input graph is a star and that the preferences
allow ties. We will consider the reachability of an object for an agent and the
problem of maximizing the utilitarian social welfare.
5.1 Weak Object Reachability in Stars
We have shown thatWeak Object Reachability in paths is NP-hard. Next, we
show thatWeak Object Reachability in stars can be solved in polynomial time.
We first show several properties of the problem, which will allow us to transform
the original problem to the problem of whether the target object is reachable for
the center agent under some constraints. We further show that if such kinds of
feasible assignments exist, then there is a sequence of swaps to reach a feasible
assignment such that each leaf agent participates in at most one swap, which is
called a simple sequence. Inspired by the idea of the algorithm for the strict version
by Gourve`s et al. [15], we construct an auxiliary graph and show that a satisfying
simple sequence exists if and only if the auxiliary graph has a directed path from
one given vertex to another given vertex. Thus, we can solve the problem by finding
a directed path in a graph.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the network is a star of n vertices
and the center agent of the star is n; the initially endowed object assigned to each
agent i is oi. It is trivial for the case of asking whether the center object on is
reachable for a leaf agent k, where we only need to check whether on k ok and
ok n on. Next, we consider whether an object of a leaf agent is reachable for
another agent. Without loss of generality, we assume that the problem is to ask
whether object o1 is reachable for agent k, where k is allowed to be n.
Since the network is a star, each feasible swap must include the center agent
n. This property will be frequently used in our analysis. Next, we show more
properties of the problem.
Lemma 16 For any agent i0 6∈ {1, k, n}, if oi0 ≻n o1 or on ≻n oi0 , then deleting
agent i0 and its initially endowed object oi0 will not change the reachability of the
instance.
Proof For any agent i0 with on ≻n oi0 , it cannot participate in a feasible swap,
because the center agent n will not hold an object worse than its initially endowed
object on. So we can simply delete it. Next, we assume that oi0 ≻n o1. Agent
i0 can only be a leaf agent because i0 6= n. Before agent k holds object o1, the
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center agent n cannot hold object i0, otherwise agent n will not get o1 anymore
and then agent k cannot get o1. Since i0 6= k, we can assume that agent i0 does
not participate in any swap and delete it. ⊓⊔
Lemma 17 If ok ≻k o1 or on ≻n o1, then o1 is not reachable for agent k.
Proof Since any agent will not receive an object worse than its initially endowed
object, we know that agent k will not receive o1 if ok ≻k o1. For the case of
on ≻n o1, the center agent n will not receive o1 and then k will not be able to get
object o1. ⊓⊔
Based on Lemma 16 and Lemma 17, we can further assume that o1 n oi n on
for any i 6= k and o1 k ok.
Lemma 18 If o1 ≻n ok and k 6= n, then o1 is not reachable for agent k.
Proof Assume to the contrary that that o1 is reachable for agent k. In the se-
quence of assignments from the initial one to a reachable one via swaps, we let
ox1 , ox2 , . . . , oxl be the sequence of different objects assigned to agent k, where
ox1 = ok and oxl = o1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, there is a swap between agent n
and agent k where agent n holds object oxi+1 and agent k holds object oxi (before
the swap). This means that oxi n oxi+1 . So we get
ox1 n ox2 n . . . n oxl .
This is in contradiction with the fact that o1 ≻n ok. So we know that o1 is not
reachable for agent k for this case. ⊓⊔
To solveWeak Object Reachability in stars, we consider whether k = n or
not. If k = n, it is to check whether object o1 is reachable for the center agent n.
If k 6= n, we will transfer it to checking the reachability of o1 for the center agent
n under some constraints. Our idea is based on the following observations. Before
object o1 reaches agent k 6= n, object o1 must be held by the center agent n. We
will first consider the case that k 6= n.
Definition 6 An assignment σ is called crucial if it holds that σ(n) = o1, o1 k
σ(k) and σ(k) n o1.
Observation 3 Assume that k 6= n. Object o1 is reachable for agent k if and only
if there is a reachable crucial assignment.
Proof Before the last swap to reach a reachable assignment σ such that σ(k) =
o1, the assignment is a reachable crucial assignment. Furthermore, for a crucial
assignment, we can make a trade between n and k so that agent k can get object
o1. ⊓⊔
Next, we will analyze the properties of reachable crucial assignments and design
an algorithm to find them if they exist.
Lemma 19 Assume that k 6= n. For any sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) such
that σt is a reachable crucial assignment (if it exists), it holds that σi(k) n o1
for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}.
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Proof Assume to the contrary that there exists σi (0 ≤ i ≤ t) such that o1 ≻n
σi(k). We take σi as the initial endowment and then o1 is not reachable for agent
k by Lemma 18 and Observation 3. This is in contradiction with the existence of
σt. So the lemma holds. ⊓⊔
Definition 7 A sequence of swaps is called simple if each leaf agent in the star
participates in at most one swap.
Lemma 20 If there exists a reachable crucial assignment, then there exists a sim-
ple sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) such that σt is crucial and σi(k) n o1 holds
for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}.
Proof Assume reachable crucial assignments exist. We let ψ = (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt)
be one of the shortest sequences of swaps such that σt is a reachable crucial
assignment. Assume to the contrary that at least one leaf agent participates in two
swaps in ψ. Then σi(n) = σj(n) will hold for two different indices 0 ≤ i < j ≤ t.
We assume that j is the maximum index satisfying the above condition. By the
selection of the index j, we know that any leaf agent that participates in a swap in
(σj , σj+1, . . . , σt) will not participate in any swap before σj . Thus, after deleting
the sequence of swaps in (σi, σi+1, . . . , σj) from ψ, we will still get a feasible
sequence of swaps. However, the length of the new sequence of swaps is shorter
than that of ψ, a contradiction to the choice of ψ. So we know that ψ must be
simple. By Lemma 19, we know that σi(k) n o1 holds for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}.
Thus, the lemma holds. ⊓⊔
Lemma 21 Assume that k 6= n, o1 k ok and ok n o1. There is an algo-
rithm that runs in O(n2) time to check the existence of a simple sequence of
swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) such that σt is crucial and σi(k) n o1 holds for any
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}, and to find one if it exists.
Proof We will transform the problem to a problem of finding a simple directed path
in an auxiliary graph following the idea of the algorithm for strict preferences given
in [15]. For a simple sequence of swaps, the center agent and a leaf agent make a
trade only when the leaf agent holds its initially endowed object. We construct an
auxiliary directed graph GD = (N,ED) on the set N of agents. There is an arc
−→
ij
from agent i ∈ N to agent j ∈ N \{n, k, i} if and only if the center agent n and the
leaf agent j can rationally trade when the center agent n holds object oi and the
leaf agent j holds object oj , i.e., oi j oj and oj n oi. There is an arc
−→
ik from
agent i ∈ N \ {1, k} to agent k if and only if o1 k oi k ok and ok n oi n o1.
The auxiliary graph can be constructed in O(n2) by using some data structure.
Next, we show that a simple sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) such that σt is
crucial and σi(k) n o1 holds for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t} exists if and only if there is
a simple directed path from n to 1 in graph GD.
It is easy to see that such a simple sequence of swaps implies a simple directed
path from n to 1 in GD . We consider the other direction and assume that a simple
directed path P from n to 1 in GD exists. We can further assume that no vertex
appears more than once in P since a simple path always exists if a path between
two vertices exists. We can get a sequence (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) of swaps according to
P : swap (σi, σi+1) is a trade between n and the head of the ith arc in P . First,
the sequence of swaps is simple because no vertex appears more than once in P .
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Second, it holds that σt(n) = o1 because the last swap happens between agent
n and agent 1 and this is the first swap including agent 1. Third, it holds that
o1 k σi(k) for every i because agent k has an initially endowed object ok such
that o1 k ok and GD has no arc from j to k for any j with oj ≻k o1. Last,
we have σi(k) n o1 for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t} because agent k has an initially
endowed object ok such that ok n o1 and GD has no arc from i to k for any i
with o1 ≻n oi. Therefore, we know that σt is crucial and σi(k) n o1 holds for
any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}.
A simple directed path from n to 1 in graph GD can be computed in linear
time by the depth-first search. The lemma holds. ⊓⊔
For the case of k = n, we still need the following Lemma 22 and Lemma 23.
The proof of Lemma 22 is referred to the first part of the proof of Lemma 20. We
omit the redundant arguments. The same arguments in Lemma 21 can be used to
prove Lemma 23. However, the construction of the auxiliary graph is a little bit
different.
Lemma 22 If object o1 is reachable for the center agent n, then there exists a
simple sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) such that σt(n) = o1.
Lemma 23 Verifying the existence of a simple sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt)
such that σt(n) = o1, and constructing it if it exists, can be done in O(n
2).
Proof We construct an auxiliary directed graph GD = (N,ED) on the set N of
agents. There is an arc
−→
ij from agent i ∈ N to agent j ∈ N \ {n, i} if and only if
the center agent n and the leaf agent j can rationally trade when the center agent
n holds object oi and the leaf agent j holds object oj , i.e., oi j oj and oj n oi.
Similar to the argument in the proof of Lemma 21, we can prove that a simple
sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) such that σt(n) = o1 exists if and only if there
is a simple directed path from n to 1 in graph GD . ⊓⊔
The main steps of our algorithm are listed in Algorithm 3.
Theorem 5 Weak Object Reachability in stars can be solved in O(n2) time.
Proof We prove this theorem by proving the correctness of Algorithm 3. By
Lemma 16, we can do Steps 1-3 to simplify the instance. By Lemma 17, we can
verify the correctness of Steps 4-5, and by Lemma 18, we can verify the correctness
of Steps 6-7. After Step 7, it always holds that o1 k ok, o1 n on and ok n o1
for k 6= n. For the case of k 6= n, the correctness of Steps 8-10 is derived from
Observation 3, Lemma 20 and Lemma 21. For the case of k = n, it is to check
whether o1 is reachable for the center agent n and the correctness of Steps 12-13
is derived from Lemma 22 and Lemma 23.
Before Step 8, the algorithm uses linear time. Steps 8-10 use O(n2) time and
Steps 12-13 use O(n2) time. ⊓⊔
5.2 Maximizing The Utilitarian Social Welfare in Stars
For Weak Pareto Efficiency in stars, we did not find a polynomial-time al-
gorithm or a proof for the NP-hardness. However, we can prove the hardness of
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Algorithm 3: The Algorithm for Weak Object Reachability in Stars
Input: An instance in a star, where we assume that n is the center agent in the star,
o1 6= on and k 6= 1.
Output: To determine whether o1 is reachable for agent k
1 for each i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n− 1} \ {k} do
2 if oi ≻n o1 or on ≻n oi then
3 delete agent i and object oi;
4 if ok ≻k o1 or on ≻n o1 then
5 return no and quit;
6 if k 6= n and o1 ≻n ok then
7 return no and quit;
8 if k 6= n then
9 Check whether there is a simple directed path from n to 1 in the graph GD
constructed in the proof of Lemma 21;
10 return yes if it exists and no otherwise;
11 else
12 Check whether there is a simple directed path from n to 1 in the graph GD
constructed in the proof of Lemma 23;
13 return yes if it exists and no otherwise.
the problem to find a solution maximizing the utilitarian social welfare. In this
problem, the preference profile is replaced with the value function.
To prove the NP-hardness, we give a reduction from the known NP-complete
problem – the Directed Hamiltonian Path problem [25], which is to find a
directed path visiting each vertex exactly once in a directed graph D = (V,A). We
construct an instance I of the problem such that I admits a reachable assignment
with the utilitarian social welfare at least 3|V | + |A| − 1 if and only if the graph
D has a directed Hamiltonian path starting from a given vertex s ∈ V . We simply
assume that s has no incoming arcs.
Instance I is constructed as follows. It contains |V |+ |A|+ 1 agents and |V |+
|A|+ 1 objects. For each arc e ∈ A, there is an associated agent ae, called an arc
agent. For each vertex v ∈ V , there is an associated agent av, called a vertex agent.
So there are |A| arc agents and |V | vertex agents. There is also a center agent ac,
which is adjacent to all arc agents and vertex agents to form a star.
In the initial endowment σ0, the object assigned to the center agent ac is oc,
called the center object ; for each vertex agent av, the object assigned to it is ov,
called a vertex object ; and for each arc agent ae, the object assigned to it is oe,
called an arc object.
Next, we construct the value function for each agent. For the center agent ac,
all objects have the same value of 0. For the starting vertex agent as, the initially
endowed object os is valued 1, the center object oc is valued 2, and all other objects
are valued 0. For any vertex agent av with v ∈ V \{s}, the initially endowed object
ov is valued 1, arc object oe with e being an arc from a vertex to the vertex v
is valued 2, and all other objects are valued 0. For any arc agent ae with e ∈ A,
where e = −→uv is an arc starting from u to v, the initially endowed object oe is
valued 1, the vertex object ou is valued 2, and all other objects are valued 0.
See Figure 10 and Table 4 for an example to construct the instance.
From the value functions of instance I, we can see the following properties.
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s
t
v
u
⇒
a−→sv a−→st a−→vu
a−→
tv
a−→
ut
ac
as av at au
Fig. 10 An example of the construction in the proof of Theorem 6
Table 4 The value functions of the example in Figure 10
Objects
Agents
ac as av at au a−→sv a−→st
a−→vu a−→tv
a−→
ut
oc 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
os 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
ov 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
ot 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0
ou 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
o−→sv 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
o−→
st
0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
o−→vu 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0
o−→
tv
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
o−→
ut
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
(P1) the utilitarian social welfare of the initial endowment is exactly |V |+ |A|;
(P2) the vertex agent as can only participate in a trade with ac where os and oc
are swapped;
(P3) the first swap must happen between agents as and ac, because all other agents
value object oc as 0;
(P4) for a vertex object ov, among all vertex agents, only vertex agent av values it
as 1 and all other vertex agents value it as 0;
(P5) for a vertex object ov, among all arc agents, only arc agents whose arc starts
from vertex v value it as 2, and all other arc agents value it as 0;
(P6) for an arc object oe, among all vertex agents, only vertex agents which is the
endpoint of edge e value it as 2, and all other vertex agents value it as 0;
(P7) for an arc object oe, among all arc agents, only arc agent ae values it as 1 and
all other arc agents value it as 0.
From (P4), (P5), (P6) and (P7), we can see that
(P8) when a vertex object ov is held by the center agent ac, the next swap can only
be a trade between the center agent ac and an arc agent ae with e being an
arc starting from vertex v;
(P9) when an arc object oe is held by the center agent ac, the next swap can only
be a trade between the center agent ac and the vertex agent av with v being
the ending point of arc e.
Based on the above properties, we prove the following results.
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Lemma 24 Instance I has a reachable assignment such that the total value of all
agents is at least 3|V |+ |A| − 1 if and only if there is a directed Hamiltonian path
starting from vertex s in the directed graph D.
Proof Assume that there is a directed Hamiltonian path v1v2v3 . . . , v|V | starting
from s in the directed graph D, where v1 = s and the arc from vi to vi+1 is
denoted by ei. We show that there is a satisfying sequence of swaps in I. Note
that each swap in a star happens between the center agent and a leaf agent. So a
sequence of swaps can be specified by a sequence of leaf agents. So we will use a
sequence of leaf agents to denote a sequence of swaps. In fact, we will show that
(av1 , ae1 , av2 , ae2 , . . . , ae|V |−1 , av|V |) is a satisfying sequence of swaps in I.
It is easy to verify that the first two swaps can be executed. We can prove by
induction that, for each i > 1, before the swap between ac and avi (resp., aei),
agent ac holds object oei−1 (resp., ovi−1) and agent avi holds object ovi (resp., agent
aei holds object oei). According to (P4), (P5), (P6), (P7) and the fact that the
center agent ac has no difference among all the objects, we know that the sequence
of swaps (av1 , ae1 , av2 , ae2 , . . . , ae|V |−1 , av|V |) can be executed. Furthermore, for
each swap in the sequence, the leaf agent participating in the swap will increase
its value by 1. There are 2|V | − 1 swaps and the initial endowment has a value of
|V | + |A|. So in the final assignment, the total value is |V | + |A| + (2|V | − 1) =
3|V |+ |A| − 1.
Next, we assume that there is a reachable assignment σ with the total value
of agents at least 3|V | + |A| − 1 in I. Based on this assumption, we construct
a Hamiltonian path starting from s in D. We let a sequence of leaf agents π =
(ax1 , ax2 , . . . , axl) to denote the sequence of swaps from the initial endowment
to the final assignment σ, where we assume that xi 6= xi+1 for all i since two
consecutive swaps happened between the same pair of agents mean doing nothing
and they can be deleted. We will show that π is a sequence of alternating elements
between vertices and arcs in D.
By (P3), we know that x1 is s. We consider two cases: all vertex agents in π are
different or not. We first consider the case that all vertex agents in π are different.
For this case, it is easy to see that all arc agents in π are also different by the value
functions of the agents. Now all agents in π are different. By (P8) and (P9), we
know that the sequence of vertices and arcs in D corresponding to π is a directed
path starting from s.
We also have the following claims by the fact that each vertex and arc agent
appears at most once in π. For each swap in π, if it is a trade between ac and
a vertex agent av, then the object hold by agent av changes from the initially
endowed object ov to an arc object oe, where agent av must value object oe as
2. Thus, the value of agent av increases by 1. For each swap in π, if it is a trade
between ac and an arc agent ae, then the object hold by agent ae changes from
the initially endowed object oe to a vertex object ov, where agent ae must value
object ov as 2. Thus, the value of agent ae increases by 1. In any case, each swap
will increase the total value by exactly 1. By (P1), the utilitarian social welfare of
the initial endowment is |V |+ |A|. So there are exactly 3|V |+ |A|−1−(|V |+ |A|) =
2|V | − 1 swaps in π. The length of π is 2|V | − 1 and then π contains |V | vertices
and |V | − 1 arcs, where all vertices are different. This can only be a Hamiltonian
path.
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Next, we consider the case that some vertex agents appear at least twice in π.
Let π′ be the shortest subsequence of π starting from the beginning agent as such
that a vertex agent appears twice in π′. Let av be the last agent in π
′. By the
choice of π′, we know that each agent in π′ except the last one appears at most
once in π′. By (P8) and (P9), we know that π′ is corresponding to a directed path
starting from s in D, where only the last vertex v in the path appears twice. By
(P2), we know that v cannot be s. Thus, there is an arc agent ae1 before the first
appearance of av in π
′. Let ae2 be the agent before the second appearance of av
in π′, i.e., the last but one agent in π′. We can see that before the second swap
between ac and av, center agent ac holds object oe2 and vertex agent av holds
object oe1 , where both e1 and e2 are arcs with the ending point being v. After this
swap, center agent ac will hold object oe1 and vertex agent av will hold object oe2 .
From then on, only vertex agent av can make a trade with center agent ac. We
have assumed that there are no two consecutive swaps that happened between the
same pair of agents. Thus the second av must be the last agent in π. Furthermore,
in the last swap between ac and av, the value of av will not increase. By the above
analysis for the first case, we know that π′′ = (ax1 , ax2 , . . . , axl−2) is corresponding
to a simple directed path, where axl−2 is a vertex agent. In π, the total value of
the agents can increase by at most 1 during the last but one swap between ac and
axl−1 , and can increase by 0 during the last swap between ac and axl . There is an
odd number of agents in π′′ since vertex agents and arc agents appear alternately
in it and both the first and the last agents are vertex agents. Each swap in π′′
can increase the total value by 1. Since the total value of the last assignment is at
least 3|V | + |A| − 1 and the initial value is |V |+ |A|, we know that the length of
π′′ is at least 2|V | − 1, which implies that π′′ is corresponding to a Hamiltonian
path. ⊓⊔
Lemma 24 implies that
Theorem 6 Finding a reachable assignment that maximizes the utilitarian social
welfare is NP-hard even when the network is a star.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we investigate some problems about how to obtain certain assign-
ments from an initial endowment via a sequence of rational trades between two
agents under two different preferences: ties are allowed (weak preferences) or not
(strict preferences). We assume that the agents are embedded in a social network
and only neighbors are allowed to exchange their objects. This is a reasonable
assumption since it well simulates the situation in real life. To understand the
computational complexity of the problem, we consider different network struc-
tures. See Table 1 in the introduction for a survey of the results.
For Object Reachability, now we know it can be solved in polynomial time
in paths. Recently, it was shown in [21] that it can also be solved in polyno-
mial time in cycles, which implies the problem is polynomial-time solvable in
graphs with maximum degree 2. Will the problem become NP-hard in graphs with
maximum degree 3? How about the computational complexity of the problem in
bounded-degree trees? Finding more social structures under which the problem is
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polynomial-time solvable will be helpful for us to understand the nature of the
problem.
In this paper, we regard the preferences of agents as independent. In real life,
the preferences of agents may be similar, i.e., some objects are preferred by most
agents. Will the problem become easier if the preferences have some properties
like single peakedness or single crossingness?
In our model, we only consider trades between two agents. Trades among three
or more agents also exist, such as in kidney exchange, a trade among three agents is
common and a trade among nine agents (a 9-cycle kidney exchange) was performed
successfully in 2015 at two San Francisco hospitals [26]. General trades among an
arbitrary number of agents have been considered in [20]. It would be interesting
to further reveal more properties of the model under general trades. In kidney
exchange, each agent is allowed to participate in at most one trade. In our model,
an agent can participate in an arbitrary number of trades. Another direction for
further study is to consider the model with an upper bound on the number of
trades for each agent. It has been proved in [27] that Object Reachability is
NP-hard in graphs with maximum degree 4 even if the maximum number of swaps
that each agent can participate is 2.
We believe it is worthy to further study more object allocation models under
exchange operations, especially for problems coming from real-life applications.
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